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Abstract: Dillon S. Myer (1891–1982) has been framed as the lone villain in incarcerating 
and dispersing the Japanese Americans during WWII (as director of the War Relocation 
Authority) and terminating and relocating Native American tribes in the 1950s (as 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs). This view is almost solely based on the 1987 biography 
Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Racism by Richard Drinnon. 
Little more has been written about Myer and his views, and a comprehensive comparison of 
the programs is yet to be published. This article compares the aims of the assimilation and 
relocation policies, especially through Myer’s public speeches. They paint a picture of a 
bureaucrat who was committed to his job, who held strongly onto the ideals of 
Americanization and assimilation, and who saw “mainstream” white American culture as 
something for all to strive after, but who was hardly an utter racist. 
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Some thirty years ago, historian Richard Drinnon came across an overlooked 
connection: Dillon S. Myer, a long-term government civil servant, had led both the 
War Relocation Authority in charge of the incarceration of Japanese Americans 
during World War II and the Bureau of Indian Affairs during the termination and 
relocation policies of the 1950s, thus overseeing the control and dispersal of two 
ethnic American minorities. Drinnon’s research was published as Keeper of 
Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Racism (1987), in which he 
framed Myer as a man whose actions were primarily guided by his racism.1 This 
view as well as the notion of Myer as a colorless bureaucrat carrying out President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s orders, has prevailed in most of the research literature, and 
little has been done to compare the two policies.2 
This article compares the resettlement programs that sought to Americanize 
the Japanese Americans during their World War II incarceration and the 
assimilation and relocation policies targeting Native Americans in the post-war 
United States.3 While the two groups were very different, the programs had many 
                                                          
1 Richard Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps: Dillon S. Myer and American Racism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). 
2 See, for example, Kenneth R. Philp, “Dillon S. Myer and the Advent of Termination: 1950–1953,” 
Western Historical Quarterly 19, no. 1 (1988): 37-59. 
3 Various stages of research for this article have been financially supported by the Finnish 
Cultural Foundation, Kone Foundation, and the University of Helsinki Faculty of Arts. The 
author wishes to thank her reviewers for insightful feedback. 
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similarities. First, white people perceived both groups as having inferior cultural 
traits and pursued their transformation into something more desirable—that is, 
their understanding of what it meant to be “American.” Second, both programs 
were led by Dillon S. Myer at significant points.  
Dillon Seymour Myer was born in 1891 in Ohio, where he grew up on a farm 
and received a religious upbringing. After earning two university degrees, first in 
agriculture and later in education, Myer held various positions as an agricultural 
expert in several eastern states before his appointment as the director of the War 
Relocation Authority (WRA), an independent civilian agency in charge of 
incarcerating Japanese Americans in 1942. He was preceded in this task by Milton 
Eisenhower, who led the agency for the first few months of its existence. 
Eisenhower and Myer were colleagues from the US Department of Agriculture, 
and several other higher officials in the WRA hailed from that department.4 
As the legal scholar Eric Muller has pointed out, in research literature the 
WRA has typically been treated as a separate venture, unconnected to previous 
policies or administrative structures.5 In reality, its officials, including those at 
the top, had extensive experience with leading people. Similarly, scholarship has 
by and large neglected a thorough comparison of the “relocation” programs or the 
agencies conducting them.6 In addition to sharing officials and ideological aims, 
the programs were executed in similar ways. In both cases, “field offices” were 
established to help the resettlers (those relocated away from their former homes) 
to find employment and housing. Japanese and Native American resettlers both 
had to go through a series of interviews to determine their suitability for the 
programs, and both were equipped with instructional pamphlets on how to conduct 
themselves in their new home towns.  
While Myer’s role and character are the subject of Richard Drinnon’s study, 
which depicts him as an out-and-out racist, in this article I aim to draw a more 
balanced interpretation of Dillon S. Myer based mostly on his public speeches. I 
will also touch upon Myer’s correspondence during his years in office. The speeches 
were delivered at a diverse array of venues, both by invitation and in talks open 
to public, and to diverse audiences. At times, Myer spoke to an audience already 
sharing his views, such as the Christian organizations at Buck Hill Falls, 
Pennsylvania, in 1951, while at other times the audience consisted of some of the 
most vocal opponents of his goals, as was the case with the American Legion at 
Indianapolis in 1943.7 
                                                          
4 Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps, xxiv–xxv, 12–19, 25; Eric L. Muller, “Of Coercion and 
Accommodation: Looking at Japanese American Imprisonment through a Law Office Window,” 
Law and History Review 35, no. 2 (2017): 171–187. 
5 Muller, “Of Coercion and Accommodation,” 391–399. 
6 Laura Sachiko Fugikawa and Karen Leong have made openings in this direction, but there have 
been no major publications as a result of their research. Leong has co-authored an article focusing 
on the Gila River Indian Community and the Japanese American incarceration camp on their 
lands. Karen Leong and Myla Vicenti Carpio, “Carceral Subjugations: Gila River Indian 
Community and Incarceration of Japanese Americans on Its Lands,” Amerasia Journal 42, no. 1 
(2016). 
7 Dillon S. Myer speech to Combined Assemblies of the Division of Christian Life and Work of the 
National Council of the Churches of Christ [hereinafter NCCC] at Buck Hills Falls, Pennsylvania, 
December 12, 1951, 2–4, National Archives [hereinafter NARA], Washington, DC, Record Group 
[hereinafter RG] 75, Office of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs [hereinafter OCIA], 
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At WRA, Myer was in charge of the ten incarceration camps confining 
120,000 Japanese Americans, the majority of whom were United States citizens. 
While running the camps, Myer and the WRA became proponents of dispersing 
the Japanese Americans across the United States and preventing them from 
forming ethnic communities after the war. When Myer became the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs in 1950, he directed the agency during the years that led to the 
termination and relocation policies with much the same aims: removing the 
special status of native tribes and convincing Native Americans to relocate to 
different parts of the country away from reservations. 
 
Japanese Americans and Native Americans before World War II 
Many historical and cultural traits kept Japanese Americans and Native 
Americans apart as communities. Large numbers of Japanese immigrants began 
arriving to the United States only at the turn of the twentieth century, amidst an 
increasingly anti-Asian sentiment. Native Americans obviously lived on the 
continent before the first European immigrants, which renders their status 
different both on practical and mental levels. The United States actually had 
formal government-to-government relationships with dozens of Native American 
tribes. Negotiations regarding the status of a tribe, possible termination, and other 
issues were thus held between the federal government and each tribal 
government, although on an ideological level the US government tended to 
consider all tribes as coming from the same background and conditions. Similarly, 
upon initiating a program of incarceration, the government classified all people of 
Japanese ancestry as hostile aliens, despite the large number of native-born 
citizens. Being at war with Japan meant that there were no direct negotiations 
between the United States and Japan regarding the treatment of Japanese 
nationals, the Issei. Instead, the Spanish consul reported on the affairs of the Issei 
in the incarceration camps. 
The Japanese were a relatively homogenous group. Having arrived in the 
United States during the course of just three and a half decades, between 1890 
and 1924, they were also homogenous in terms of age.8 This is particularly true of 
the second-generation Nisei, most of whom were born between 1916 and 1930.9 
Adding to the homogeneity of the Nisei and the Japanese Americans in general, 
most continued to actively speak Japanese and practiced the Buddhist religion. 
The Japanese were also racially homogenous, because miscegenation laws in 
                                                          
Commissioner Dillon Myer files [hereinafter DM], Desk File: Organizations-Window Rock AO, Box 
3; “The Relocation Program,” an address by Dillon S. Myer to the State Commanders and State 
Adjutants of the American Legion, Indianapolis, Indiana, November 16, 1943, Harry S. Truman 
Library, Independence, Missouri [hereafter HSTL], Dillon S. Myer papers [hereinafter DSM]. 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/japanese_internment/docs.php. 
8 Because Japan was isolated, there were few Japanese immigrants in the US prior to 1890. 
Opposition to Japanese immigration led to the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907, which effectively 
put an end to Japanese immigration. 
9 The Nisei, or second-generation Japanese Americans, David Yoo argues, can truly be treated as 
a generation. As a point of distinction from other minorities, second-generation Japanese 
Americans not only shared the experience of having been born in a country not native to their 
parents, but they also shared the experience of growing up in the same years. David Yoo, Growing 
up Nisei: Race, Generation, and Culture among Japanese Americans of California, 1924–49 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 3.  
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California and Oregon prohibited Asians (and blacks) from marrying whites until 
1948 and 1951, respectively.10 
Native Americans, on the other hand, were extremely heterogeneous. There 
existed hundreds of tribes, languages, and religions, and most importantly,  
Native Americans identified with these tribal units. The feeling of pan-Indianism, 
while not a new phenomenon, only began to manifest itself properly during the 
1960s. When the termination policy was adopted in 1953, some tribes had been 
influenced by Euro-American expansionist politics and civilizing programs for 
centuries, while others had been confined to reservations for less than eighty 
years. Their degree of assimilation hence varied remarkably across the country. 
Compared to Japanese Americans, much racial mixing had taken place, and only 
sixty percent of Native Americans were classified as “full-blood” in 1940.11 
Nevertheless, there were also several similarities in the groups’ pre-war 
conditions. Both mostly lived in communities consisting of members of their own 
race (in the case of Native Americans, more precisely of their own tribe).12 They 
were almost exclusively educated by white Americans with Protestant values in 
mind, although a majority in both groups professed some minority religion 
(namely Buddhism or tribal religions). 
The paths of Japanese Americans and Native Americans crossed during 
World War II. Once President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 
banning Japanese Americans from the West Coast, Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs John Collier proposed to the WRA that Japanese “relocation camps” be 
established on Indian lands.13 His vision was that the camps would develop 
reservation lands, thus benefitting Native Americans after the incarceration 
                                                          
10 It should be noted that there was also strong social pressure in the Japanese American 
community against marrying someone who was not of Japanese origin. Paul Spickard, Japanese 
Americans: The Formation and Transformations of an Ethnic Group, Revised ed. (New Brunswick, 
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 35. 
11 Alison R. Bernstein, American Indians and World War II: Toward a New Era in Indian Affairs 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 86. 
12 The 1940 census found that 89 percent of Japanese Americans lived in the three West Coast 
states. Although many lived outside the actual urban Japantowns, their networks were often 
predominantly Japanese. The same year, 75 percent of Native Americans lived in eight Midwestern 
or Western states, and only five percent lived outside reservations throughout the country. U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, “Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, 
Population, Volume II: Characteristics of the Population, Part 1” (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1942), 21. Race, of course, is a complex and complicated concept, and I acknowledge 
that the data does not lend itself to straightforward interpretation. See, for example, Spickard, 
Formation and Transformations, 2–7. 
13 The terminology relating to the eviction of Japanese Americans varied from “evacuation” and 
“relocation” to “concentration.” Most commonly, the incarceration camps were called relocation 
centers. Today, the debate continues over whether these camps should be called internment, 
incarceration, or concentration camps. I have settled with the word “incarceration” and “inmate.” 
To refer to the process of moving away from the camps, contemporary authorities usually used, 
again, the term “relocation,” but to keep the terminology clear, I use the word “resettlement.” See, 
for example, Brian Masaru Hayashi, Democratizing the Enemy: The Japanese American 
Internment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Karen L. Ishizuka, Lost & Found: 
Reclaiming the Japanese American Incarceration (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006); 
Karen L. Ishizuka, “What's in a Word? History, Violence, and Erasure When the Words Are 
'Japanese Internment' and 'Muslim Registry',” https://rewire.news/article/2016/11/22/word-
history-japanese-internment/.  
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period had ended. He also believed that the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) had 
the necessary experience in dealing with a racial minority group. Two of the 
camps, Poston and Gila River in Arizona, were located on lands leased from local 
native tribes. In the end, however, Native Americans benefitted little from leasing 
their lands to the WRA, aside from the rent paid to them. Dillon S. Myer was 
reluctant to develop surplus land for farming, and after the closing of the camps, 
buildings were torn down instead of being handed over to the Native Americans. 
There was very little interaction between the Native Americans and the Japanese, 
partly because Myer emphasized the camps as way stations, and he discouraged 
the inmates from forming ties with local Native Americans since the community 
was meant to be temporary.14 
 
Locked-Up Japanese Americans 
On February 19, 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 
9066, authorizing the exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast. 
Weeks later, he ordered the establishment of the War Relocation Authority to “look 
after” the Japanese Americans after their removal. Dillon S. Myer took over the 
WRA in June 1942, after the resignation of its first director, Milton Eisenhower. 
President Roosevelt authorized the actions of the WRA, but he remained 
disinterested in the incarceration or relocation processes and met only once with 
Myer during the war. He let lower-level officials handle publicity issues and would 
not speak favorably of the inmates, even when other administrators asked him to 
do so to demonstrate his support for the WRA policy. When Roosevelt finally 
stepped up to publicly praise the Americanism of the inmates, they had been 
incarcerated for a year and public opposition against the Japanese Americans had 
increased tremendously.15 
Although the original purpose of Executive Order 9066 was to quiet anti-
Japanese hysteria, it did the opposite, suggesting to the general public that 
Japanese Americans indeed were suspicious and disloyal. It appeared that only 
confinement would provide a satisfactory solution to the “Japanese problem” 
during the war. This ran contrary to the visions of Milton Eisenhower and John 
Collier to establish planned communities for the inmates.16 
Many Congressmen spent the war years drafting plans for the exportation of 
all Japanese Americans,17 but most authorities in the field focused on the eventual 
closing of the incarceration camps. Myer, in particular, started a strong public 
campaign for the Americanization of the inmates, particularly the first generation 
Issei. His promotion of the program consisted of two main elements: the 
undemocratic nature of detaining loyal citizens and the harmful impact 
incarceration had on the Americanism of the inmates. His statements were 
                                                          
14 Bernstein, American Indians and World War II, 82–85. 
15 Greg Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 245. 
16 Ibid., 130–131. 
17 While a few Congressmen throughout the war years spoke in favor of Japanese Americans, their 
opponents dominated the majority of debates. 
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consistently in line with New Deal liberalism, which believed in the “common 
man” and advocated an individual’s right to pursue happiness.18  
The WRA employed anthropologists, or “community analysts,” both in 
Washington and in each of the ten camps. Their task was to generate information 
about the functioning of the inmate communities, which in turn was to help the 
government in policy-making. Importantly, as the anthropologist Orin Starn 
argues, they were also to promote a “positive image” of incarceration and Japanese 
Americans.19 Many of them had an academic background in acculturation studies 
and this showed in their analyses.20 
The role of these anthropologists should not be underestimated. Although 
their role was not public, and they typically did not represent the WRA outside the 
camps, my analysis of Dillon S. Myer’s speeches shows that there were many 
parallels in the phrases used in anthropologists’ reports and in Myer’s public 
speeches.21 Furthermore, it became evident throughout the reading of the archival 
records that the anthropologists were quite detailed in their description of 
community sentiments, and while they usually refrained from making direct 
recommendations, their thoughts on matters such as resettlement, come through 
in their reports.22 
Myer’s arguments and style changed very little during his years in office. 
While he modified his message somewhat depending on his audience, he 
consistently incorporated four topics into almost every speech. Most often, he 
began by arguing for the rightfulness of the incarceration decision. This was 
necessary to obtain justification for Myer’s and the WRA’s work as such, but later 
he had to make a much more powerful argument for the disbanding of the camps, 
leading to the three ensuing topics. First, Myer explained why the camps were 
undesirable (if also initially justified), which he did by drawing in elements of 
American principles and ideologies. Then followed slightly more practical 
descriptions of how the Japanese would become American. Finally, he concluded 
by explaining the ways in which they could already be considered American. This 
was not to negate his previous arguments, but to show that this group of people 
had lived for decades in America and that the power of American society had, 
indeed, been strong enough to mold them toward its ideals. This line of thought 
also attempted to convince white Americans that the camps would stop the 
positive development of the Nisei. 
In fact, Myer seemed appalled by the incarceration camps. While he called 
them communities, Myer declared that incarceration camps were “undesirable 
institutions,” where residents lived “an unnatural and un-American sort of life.” 
It remains a matter of speculation whether he meant that the restriction of 
                                                          
18 It must, again, be emphasized that the definition of happiness may have been very narrowly 
defined from a white male perspective, but it was, nevertheless, a sound vision of many of these 
bureaucrats that they were “doing the right thing.” 
19 Orin Starn, “Engineering Internment: Anthropologists and the War Relocation Authority,” 
American Ethnologist 13, no. 4 (1986): 702. 
20 Ibid., 714. 
21 Saara Kekki, “Japanese American Internment: Spectacularization, Americanization, and the 
Model Minority Myth” (MA thesis, University of Helsinki, 2009), 29–46. 
22 For the anthropologists’ reports, see Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Records 
1930–1974, Bancroft Library, Berkeley, California. Finding aid available through Online Archive 
of California, http://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf5j49n8kh.  
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freedom was un-American or whether he was more concerned about the unusual 
composition of the camp communities, consisting as they did of Japanese people 
only. He appealed to his audience to remember democratic principles: “Keep in 
mind that the evacuees were charged with nothing except having Japanese 
ancestors.” Despite speaking for the resettlement of inmates from the camps, a 
fear of disloyal activity was still present. Myer continued to believe that the 
“segregation of loyal Americans from the disloyal element is essential.”23 This 
conviction, not only of Myer but of most officials and the general public, persisted 
throughout the war and resulted in the designation of the Tule Lake camp as a 
segregation unit.24 
Apart from the requested confinement of the “disloyal element,” Myer argued 
against the incarceration of loyal people. He frequently returned to the concept of 
“the American way” to win supporters for resettlement. “The American way,” Myer 
argued, was not to “have children grow up behind barbed wire,” under conditions 
“which make a mockery out of principles we have always cherished.” More 
generally, the American way was to be democratic and guarantee equal 
opportunity to all those who adhered to American principles. In the camp 
environment, such principles were difficult to maintain. According to Myer, loyalty 
“cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and discrimination.”25 
Myer, however, had “faith in the American way of life and in the melting pot 
tradition on which this nation has developed.” These principles would cause the 
mainstream to accept the settlement of the Japanese into new communities.26 The 
WRA could not forcefully resettle the inmates into mainstream America or take 
sole responsibility for educating good Americans. Americans themselves must see 
that it is the right thing to do. Of course, Myer acknowledged, “democracy is never 
an easy form of government. […] it can be made to operate successfully only if the 
people have the necessary energy, ingenuity and especially courage to make it 
work.”27 This was a subtle hint at the responsibility of the general public to show 
their Americanness. Myer’s images, however, were powerful. In a time of war, few 
people would miss an opportunity to show courage and to do their share. 
Furthermore, Myer scolded certain Americans for discriminating against other 
                                                          
23 Myer, “An Anniversary Statement,” March 1943, HSTL, DSM. 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/japanese_internment/docs.php 
24 The segregation took place after completing a “loyalty questionnaire,” in which inmates were 
requested to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States. Issei found this problematic, 
because they did not qualify for American citizenship, and thus, feared a positive answer would 
make them stateless if the United States were to lose the war and Japan were to re-examine their 
permission to return to Japan. Many Nisei were insulted by the implication that they would be 
loyal to any other country than that of their birth. As a result, about 12,000 people registered a 
“no” response and were moved to Tule Lake. Of those refusing to swear allegiance, over 4,000 were 
repatriated or expatriated to Japan, although some later returned to the United States. Michi 
Nishiura Weglyn, Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America's Concentration Camps (New York: 
Morrow, 1976), 260–269. 
25 Myer, “Speech over the National Broadcasting Company network,” July 15, 1943, HSTL, DSM. 
26 Myer, “The Relocation Program,” November 16, 1943, HSTL, DSM. 
27 Myer, “The Facts about the War Relocation Authority,” January 21, 1944, HSTL, DSM. 
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American citizens merely “for accidents of ancestry,” another popular image of 
his.28  
Myer repeatedly noted that the United States could not keep its citizens 
locked up in camps when the country was involved in a war to stop such treatment 
elsewhere. One of his most powerful statements on appealing to democratic ideals 
he repeated several times: “Let’s not deal with the problem as Hitler would handle 
it under his Nazi regime, or as Tojo would deal with it in Japan. Let’s do it in the 
American way.”29 Herein, he posed a strong challenge for Americans: How might 
they avoid reducing themselves to the level of their enemies? The answer, Myer 
suggested, was that the Japanese Americans need and should receive “help” in 
assimilating. 
Rather than emphasizing the rights of the inmates and making them the 
center of focus, he gave the role of the protagonist to mainstream America. If the 
Japanese were kept in the camps until the war was over, Myer said, the country 
would face an enormous problem. The end of the war would result in the return of 
the inmates “to the place they called home—and the Little Tokyos would probably 
spring up again, with all their undesirable features.”30 This was in clear contrast 
to the speeches he made as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in which he had 
emphasized the responsibility of Native Americans to improve their conditions and 
did not seem to worry about their returning to reservations. 
Thus, to justify his call for acceptance of the resettlement program, Myer kept 
reminding his audiences of the founding ideals of the nation. Americans must 
portray their excellence as a nation by tolerating, even helping out, all groups in 
their country. People in need—in this case, the Japanese Americans—should be 
integrated into the greatness of America. This, again, was a demonstration of his 
New Deal liberal ideology—of the idea that people deserve the right to pursue the 
American dream, however abstract it may be. 
Myer’s statements regarding Americanization and assimilation became more 
frequent as the war progressed. These comments intertwined with the rest of 
Myer’s rhetoric, which aimed at generating a more approving climate for the “final 
relocation” of the inmates.  
He noted that the “almost complete assimilation” of the Japanese Hawaiians 
had encouraged scores of young men to volunteer for the army. In the continental 
United States, however, racism and discrimination had spurred negative 
responses to service. He felt that assimilation was a desirable outcome for 
immigrants, but he also admitted that the conditions for assimilation had not been 
favorable on the mainland. 
To counter the assumption of unassimilability as the root of discrimination 
against the Japanese Americans, Myer repeatedly argued that viewing the 
American-born Nisei as “Japanese” would be “equivalent to asserting that 
American institutions exercise a less potent influence over the youthful mind than 
the transplanted institutions of the Orient.” To the contrary, Myer pledged his 
faith in American institutions, to which “few human minds can be exposed to […] 
                                                          
28 Myer, “Relocation Problems and Policies,” March 14, 1944. Later, Myer used the same image at 
least in “Racism and Reason,” October 2, 1944; “A Message from the Director of the War Relocation 
Authority [to evacuees resident in relocation centers],” January 1945, HSTL, DSM. 
29 Myer, “March of Time,” June 24, 1943, HSTL, DSM. 
30 Myer, “The Truth about Relocation,” August 6, 1943, HSTL, DSM. 
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without absorbing the rich heritage of American life.” Strong proof of this notion 
was the fact that the inmates had “reached out” to American institutions, such as 
the Boy Scouts, even “in such an artificial atmosphere.”31 This was a very typical 
view of the WRA officials: that the Nisei were highly assimilated, while the Issei 
were for the most part unassimilated.  
Nevertheless, while educational programs in the camps promoted 
Americanism, Myer argued that they “can never be wholly effective” in a camp 
environment. “The influences that operate every day and every week to make us 
a distinctive people on the face of the globe cannot be reproduced within an 
atmosphere of restriction,” he stated. The purpose of the relocation program was 
to disperse the population to “other parts of the country, where they can be 
absorbed readily.”32 
The job of the WRA, in Myer’s view, was to ease the relocation of Japanese 
Americans from the centers “into normal communities where they can develop into 
normal men and women.” In this context, Myer continued to argue for the potency 
of American institutions, repeating his earlier criticism of those who thought that 
“merely because an individual is of Japanese extraction, he is somehow immune 
to the effect of our public school system.”33  
Thus, Myer said, the American public must stop looking for ways in which 
the Japanese are different, and rather embrace their similarity with the rest of 
the Americans. Myer felt that although the resettlement endeavor might be 
difficult, “it is a job that must be accomplished if the American way of life is to 
have real meaning to these people.”34 Eventually, an “American in the full sense 
of the word […] acts with goodwill toward his neighbors, makes sacrifices for his 
country, does the things that he believes help all races, creeds and groups to work 
together and make this a strong nation.”35 This can be interpreted as a message 
to Japanese Americans, white Americans, and foreigners. On the surface, Myer 
provided a description of a “good American,” a description of the Japanese 
Americans once properly assimilated. At the same time, it was a plea to the 
general public to act in an American way, that is, by allowing the inmates to 
resettle. Finally, it was a reminder to outsiders, friends, and enemies alike that 
the actions of the United States are guided by a higher creed and should be taken 
seriously. 
Myer also had a message for the inmates in camps. Instead of “breaking their 
present connections and moving back to their old home communities,” they should 
seriously consider moving east.36 Confusingly, however, Myer did not explain how 
their moving across the country would amount to retaining all the “present 
connections” and benefit the inmates in any way. Myer’s tendency to 
simultaneously promote a policy of assimilation and Americanization as well as 
the already extraordinary Americanism of the Japanese Americans further 
                                                          
31 Myer, “Problems of Evacuee Resettlement in California,” June 19, 1945, HSTL, DSM. 
32 Myer, “The Truth about Relocation”; “The Relocation Program,” HSTL, DSM. 
33 Myer, “Relocation Problems and Policies,” HSTL, DSM. 
34 Myer, “One Thousandth of a Nation,” March 23, 1944, HSTL, DSM. 
35 Myer, “Racism and Reason,” HSTL, DSM. 
36 Myer, “A Message from the Director.” 
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confused his argument at this point.37 It is as though Myer thought that the 
“American character” of the Nisei could disappear. The large number of citizenship 
renunciations can be interpreted as such—or, as I do, mostly as an expression of 
frustration and disillusionment with one’s home country. 
For years following the war, official Japanese American civil rights 
organizations, namely the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL), which 
represented the younger generation, viewed Myer as a benefactor who saved the 
inmates by promoting their return to normal life. In 1946, the JACL organized a 
banquet in Myer’s honor, praising him as a “champion of human rights and 
common decency.”38 They viewed Myer as having played a crucial role in their 
eventual resettlement into American life, and the fact that after incarceration 
their status in society slowly began to rise.39 
Myer lost his status as the hero of the Japanese Americans during the 1970s 
and 1980s redress campaign, and he became one of the main individual targets of 
the movement. The third-generation Sansei hardly saw him as a benevolent hero, 
but instead held him responsible for the troubles of the Nisei and the 
disintegration and deprivation of post-war Japanese American communities. Myer 
died in 1982, amidst the hearings of the Commission on the Wartime Relocation 
and Internment of Civilians, in which the JACL was seeking to convict Myer for 
his role in their incarceration.40 
 
“The Indian Problem” 
World War II was also a watershed in Indian–white relations. Native Americans 
were actively involved in the war effort, inevitably leading to increased contact 
between natives and whites.41 Native American veterans used their positive image 
in the wider American society to emphasize their willingness to become full 
members. They argued that their status should be improved; they had been “good 
enough” to fight the war, and they should be “good enough” to own property and 
enjoy full civil rights.42 
The government found in the veterans fertile soil to promote assimilation, 
and it began making plans to offer work placement for returning veterans. Acting 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Barton Greenwood suggested in 1945 that the 
                                                          
37 Most Nisei were, in fact, extremely Americanized despite their frequent exclusion from 
mainstream society. They had been educated in the American public schools, but their parents 
were also adamant that they assimilate culturally. See, for example, Yoo, Growing up Nisei.  
38 Dillon S. Myer, Uprooted Americans. The Japanese Americans and the War Relocation Authority 
during World War II (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1972), 342.  
39 The JACL was a controversial organization throughout the incarceration years and thereafter. 
Many felt that the organization had sold Japanese American civil rights too cheaply by conceding 
to incarceration. While a good number of people supported the JACL, its stand was by no means 
universally approved. See, for example, Frank S. Emi, “Protest and Resistance: An American 
Tradition,” in A Matter of Conscience, ed. Mike Mackey (Powell: Western History Publications, 
2002); Yosh Kuromiya, “The Fourth Option,” ibid.  
40 Drinnon, Keeper of Concentration Camps, 251–254. 
41 There were nearly 22,000 Native Americans serving in the US military in 1944, and some 40,000 
found wartime jobs outside reservations. Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States 
Government and the American Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), 337; 
Bernstein, American Indians and World War II, 68.  
42 Donald Lee Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945–1960 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1990), 14.  
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veterans be moved as far as possible from their original environment to prevent 
them from easily returning to the reservations.43 This thought of relocating the 
veterans, and later all other Native Americans, coincided and overlapped with the 
desire to end federal–Indian relations altogether, that is, of terminating the 
special status of Native Americans. 
United States Indian policy was expensive to maintain, and all sectors of 
government faced budget cuts after the war. The first two commissioners after the 
reformer John Collier were uncontroversial figures among the whites as well as 
the Native Americans, and they mostly carried out cosmetic changes in Indian 
affairs.44 Dillon S. Myer, on the other hand, revamped the BIA administration in 
his three years in office, with the administration becoming fully committed to 
termination.45 Bills calling for the change in status of individual tribes were 
passed during Myer’s years in office, but termination of all Native Americans 
tribes was adopted as official policy by the United States government (and 
subsequently by participating tribes) shortly after Myer’s term, in August 1953. 
Upon becoming Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Myer received the 
customary congratulatory letters from former colleagues and several Native 
Americans tribes. Japanese Americans approached him to express their 
encouragement and confidence in him. Reverend Daisuke Kitagawa was pleased 
that “at long last something really creative will be done with American Indian 
people.”46 Mrs. Earl Tanbara wrote that Japanese Americans “know in part life on 
a reservation.” She further complimented Myer for his work as director of the War 
Relocation Authority: “After your outstanding work in relocating us from the 
Pacific Coast, we know that […] you will do a courageous piece of work in helping 
solve our Indian problem.”47 These statements to Myer demonstrate that the 
Japanese no longer considered themselves a problem, but identified the Native 
Americans as still being one. 
Myer identified land ownership as the main problem in Indian affairs. He 
claimed that the federal government was partly responsible for the issue, because 
Indian policy had always sought to make Indians into farmers and ranchers. This 
had tied them “to the land perhaps more closely than any other segment of our 
population.” In some areas, they had been “outstandingly successful,” but at the 
same time, such a policy prevented those uninterested in farming from moving 
away from reservations.48 In this sense, Myer and John Collier’s views were quite 
similar. They differed, however, in their stand on tribal governments. Collier 
believed that adjustment to mainstream society could only take place through 
                                                          
43 Ibid., 134. This request is very similar to those made by the authorities in the case of the 
Japanese Americans. See, for example, Dillon S. Myer, “The Truth about Relocation,” HSTL, DSM. 
44 John Collier was Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1933–1945.  
45 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 135; Prucha, The Great Father, 341.  
46 Daisuke Kitagawa to Dillon S. Myer, April 4, 1950, RG75, OCIA, DM, Desk File: 
Congratulations-Muskogee AO, Box 2, Folder 1: Congratulations & Misc. Personal. Daisuke 
Kitagawa was a Japan-born Episcopalian reverend, who became a prominent spiritual leader 
among the Japanese Americans particularly during incarceration.  
47 Mrs. Earl Tanbara to Dillon S. Myer, April 14, 1950, RG75, OCIA, DM, Desk File: Organizations-
Window Rock AO, Box 3, Folder 1: Organizations interested in Indians. 
48 Dillon S. Myer speech to Combined Assemblies of the Division of Christian Life and Work of the 
NCCC at Buck Hills Falls, Pennsylvania, December 12, 1951, 2–4, RG75, OCIA, DM, Desk File: 
Organizations-Window Rock AO, Box 3. 
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group, or tribal, processes. Myer, on the other hand, felt that tribal governments 
and the specific services aimed at Native Americans stifled the tribes’ development 
toward independence and segregated them from the rest of the society.49 This 
hindered their chances of becoming middle-class Americans and “realizing their 
full potentialities.”50  
In a post-career oral history interview, Myer drew a distinction between US 
policies before the 1920s and those in subsequent decades, strongly identifying 
with the latter and dismissing the aims and results of the former. He was of the 
opinion that practically nothing of use had been done to “stop the exploitation” of 
Native Americans and to provide them with proper education and means to 
assimilate.51  
To tackle the problems, Myer argued that the BIA should help Native 
Americans leave the reservations and take up other jobs besides those related to 
the land. The aid consisted of two parts. The first was a program of training and 
placement assistance for those who wanted to leave the reservations, while the 
second entailed giving guidance to those who wanted to remain on the reservations 
to start developing industrial programs. The programs were quite similar to the 
leave programs implemented in the Japanese American incarceration camps, and 
Myer is said to have modeled his Indian relocation program after that of the 
Japanese Americans, convinced of its ultimate success.52 Both programs 
comprised various steps to determine the applicant’s suitability, including 
applications and interviews. Authorities helped in finding jobs and housing and 
usually gave financial support during the first weeks. Both programs also included 
instruction manuals and classes for the relocatees.53  
In his BIA-era speeches, Myer continued to appeal to his listeners with 
imagery of working together, familiar from his WRA speeches. His rhetoric was 
subtler, however. He made fewer direct references to American ideals, rather only 
                                                          
49 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 72; Prucha, The Great Father, 335. Under Collier’s 
commissionership, the BIA had introduced tribal governments as ways to communicate with the 
tribes. Later scholarship has, however, noted that tribal governments were entirely set up in 
accordance with white American perceptions of government. This caused friction in many tribes, 
as traditional leadership structures were artificially changed. 
50 Dillon S. Myer speech to Combined Assemblies of the Division of Christian Life and Work of the 
NCCC at Buck Hills Falls, Pennsylvania, December 12, 1951, 2–4, RG75, OCIA, DM, Desk File: 
Organizations-Window Rock AO, Box 3. 
51 Dillon S. Myer, “Oral History Interview with Dillon S. Myer, Director, War Relocation Authority, 
1942-1946; President, Institute of Inter-American Affairs, 1947-50; Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, 1950-53,” interview by Helen S. Pryor, University of California Bancroft Library/Berkeley 
Regional Oral History Office, 286–287, quote on page 287, 
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/myerds.htm. 
52 Kenneth R. Philp, “Stride toward Freedom: The Relocation of Indians to Cities, 1952–1960,” The 
Western Historical Quarterly 16, no. 2 (1985): 179; Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 66–67. A 
leave program of sorts was also implemented at an earlier stage of handling Native American 
affairs. Already in the late nineteenth century, the US authorities, more precisely Director Captain 
Richard Henry Pratt of Carlisle Indian School, developed an “outing system” designed to send 
Native American students outside the boarding school to work for white employers. This practice 
spread to other Native American schools as well, as it was seen as an effective way of re-enforcing 
skills and Americanism learned at school. See Michael C. Coleman, American Indians, the Irish, 
and Government Schooling: A Comparative Study (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 
128.  
53 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 136.  
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alluding to them. For instance, in one of his first speeches, given to the National 
Congress of the American Indian (NCAI), he said “One of my deepest concerns is 
that the Indians of the United States shall participate in shaping the answers to 
the problems that confront them and aid in determining the rules that guide them 
in their relationship with the Federal Government.”54 While this statement clearly 
suggests that Myer wanted Native Americans to be involved in policy-making, he 
also referred to one classic American ideal: self-reliance, every man for himself. 
Speaking to Christian organizations, Myer summed up the purpose of the 
relocation program and his personal ideals very powerfully: “[…] provide the 
institutionalized Indian youngsters with the kind of home and community life they 
need if they are to grow up as self-reliant and civic-minded American citizens.”55 
In addition to suggesting that reservation life resulted in a form of 
institutionalization, Myer could be interpreted as promoting the closure of Native 
American boarding schools in favor of foster care and adoption. There is, however, 
no direct reference to such thinking in any of Myer’s speeches, and the federal 
Indian Adoption Project was initiated only after Myer’s time at the BIA, in 1958.56 
Being self-reliant and civic-minded were key to how Myer characterized good 
citizenship, but this sentence entails plenty of evaluation and criticism of Indian 
affairs and Native American communities. Indian policy, with its reservations and 
services provided only for Native Americans, had caused reservation life to become 
more or less institutionalized—despite the fact that reservations were in theory 
communities that people could move into and out of rather freely. This perception 
is similar to what Myer had said about the Japanese American incarceration 
camps. At the same time, he hinted at disapproval of Native American home and 
community life, which shows he did not understand the cultures he was dealing 
with. While many Native American communities in the 1950s suffered from 
poverty, illnesses, and alcoholism, they continued to be traditionally tightly-knit. 
Strong and extensive family networks only began to break down more decisively 
once the relocation program started to impact the various communities. 
While Myer frequently emphasized that the purpose of the programs was to 
improve the health and financial status of Native Americans, he occasionally 
suggested areas in which they themselves needed to make improvements. Often 
his views were belittling and paternalistic: “And as they move to take their places 
by the side of their fellow-Americans they will learn the techniques and procedures 
of providing for themselves and of living more adequately in our fast-changing 
industrial civilization.”57 Myer probably wanted to say that the BIA programs 
would elevate Native Americans to a new standard of living, but he also blatantly 
stated that they were indeed wards of the government, incapable of taking care of 
themselves without assistance. 
                                                          
54 “Statement of Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dillon S. Myer before the National Congress of 
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56 The author wishes to thank her anonymous reviewer for pointing out this alternative 
interpretation. 
57 Myer, NCAI 1950, 3, RG75, OCIA, DM, Box 3, Folder: Speeches. 
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The termination policy and particularly the relocation policy have usually 
been taken as examples of assimilationism. In many ways, however, Myer and the 
BIA seemed to have been more focused on the task of cutting government 
responsibility in Indian affairs. The policies were meant to persuade Native 
Americans to move away from reservations in order to ensure a higher standard 
of living, but already in 1951 Myer acknowledged that not everyone would want 
to move, and so BIA “policies and our programming must necessarily be broad 
enough to meet the needs of both types of Indian people.” He also claimed to be 
impressed by “the tremendous diversity […] among the several Indian tribes and 
groups.”58 This suggests a rather tolerant view of Native Americans, an 
appreciation of the fact that the various tribes and groups are different. 
This tolerance was not only a tactic employed directly toward the Native 
Americans. Speaking to a convention of Christians, Myer expressed his hope that 
church organizations would help accommodate Native Americans in their 
transition to urban life: “They will need help in finding suitable meeting places for 
recreational and community activities. They need to know how they can find other 
Indians who may be in the community.”59 It is remarkable that Myer talks about 
the right and significance of finding new Indian networks for people he is trying 
to make less Indian. In my interpretation, this does not mean that Myer was 
proposing segregation, because at the same time he talked about incorporating 
Native Americans into existing Boy Scout groups and other institutions. In 
conducting his WRA policy, Myer always emphasized that Japanese Americans 
should not “congregate” in their new hometowns. This change may be proof that 
he had learned from experience that ethnic organizations in fact helped in the 
adjustment phase and eventual assimilation. 
It appears that Myer and the rest of the administration and politicians saw 
the dissolving of reservations and tribes as their main goals. Native American 
cultures would be tolerated, if only Native Americans themselves would become 
more individualistic: 
 
So one of the biggest problems facing the Government is to assist the Indian in moving into 
the main stream of American life and breaking that pattern of isolation. Reservation life 
leads to a continuation of certain old ways of life and nowadays leads to a welfare type of 
state for the simple reason that there is not enough work available in many of the reservation 
areas. So poverty, problems of relocation, problems of education, problems of health and 
sanitation all go more or less hand in hand.60  
 
This is the most personal of Myer’s statements. Although the official policy sought 
also to create jobs on the reservations to support those who were not willing to 
move, Myer clearly thought that the root of the problems lay in the existence and 
structures of reservations.  
In the context of more than a hundred years of assimilationist Indian policy, 
Myer’s views hardly stand out. The whites of the early twentieth century believed 
                                                          
58 Address by Dillon S. Myer, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, at the Eighth Annual Convention of 
the National Congress of American Indians, St. Paul, Minnesota, July 25, 1951 [hereinafter NCAI 
1951], 11; 13, RG75, OCIA, DM, Box 3, Folder: Speeches. 
59 Myer, NCCC, 6, RG75, OCIA, DM, Box 3, Folder: Speeches. 
60 Memorandum to Bureau of Indian Affairs, March 20, 1953. Quoted in Myer, “Oral History 
Interview with Dillon S. Myer,” 290.  
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that Native Americans as a race would become extinct, and Myer continued to 
believe in the demise of their cultures: “I think the Indians are on the way out as 
a separate or isolated people, but it may take hundreds of years.” He also made a 
prediction on the future of Native American cultures that was proven wrong mere 
decades later: “The old rites that were practiced by the Indians in initiating young 
men into the tribe are going out of existence pretty fast. […] I am sure that this 
problem of loss of interest on the part of the young people and maintaining the old 
rites is going to be a factor in the integration process.”61 In the twenty-first  
century, we have on the contrary seen the rebirth of many Native American 
traditions and rites. On the one hand, this might be interpreted as the failure of 
BIA policies, but on the other it also speaks for a change in society. Hybrid 
identities have become more acceptable, both for society at large and for many 
individuals, which manifests itself in the re-adoption of near-forgotten cultural 
forms. 
Compared to his role in the War Relocation Authority, Myer did not have to 
justify his position as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The perception of an 
existing Indian problem was widespread across the administration and the 
general public, and it had to be solved. In similar fashion as with the WRA, 
however, Myer’s duty was, once again, to make an office redundant. In the case of 
the WRA, he succeeded, both because the Supreme Court ordered the closure of 
camps and because the WRA worked to get inmates out of the camps. With Indian 
affairs, however, the task was too big to be carried out within a short period of 
time, and in less than ten years the political atmosphere changed to support a 
subtler policy.62 
Myer seems to have failed to grasp the extent of his termination and 
relocation efforts. The relocation of Japanese Americans—whether it should be 
considered a success or not—was theoretically much easier. They were a relatively 
homogenous group (at least culturally) of less than 120,000 people, who had been 
brought in ten clearly confined camps. It was much easier to track the movements 
of these people, and, on the other hand, to convince them of the need for relocation, 
because life away from the camps was guaranteed to offer the inmates at least 
more civil rights than their present confinement. Meanwhile, Native Americans 
were an artificially labeled group of some 350,000 people, who lived across the 
country on reservation lands guaranteed to them by treaties with the 
government.63 Upon being appointed commissioner, Myer set out to make the BIA 
redundant, but what he in fact accomplished was almost a tripling of the bureau’s 
annual expenditure, and the trend continued throughout the 1950s.64  
 
Dillon S. Myer and His Legacy 
Dillon S. Myer was a controversial figure among his coworkers and the public 
throughout his career. For Japanese Americans, he was first viewed as a hero, 
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lack of interest as a problem. 
62 Undoubtedly the change also had to do with the fact that termination was not as easily carried 
out as had been hoped.  
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64 Fixico, Termination and Relocation, 73, 175–176. 
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then as a villain. White Americans accused him of coddling the Japanese inmates, 
an accusation that was often applied also to Indian Affairs in general. Later 
scholarship has either labeled him a colorless bureaucrat or a cold-hearted racist. 
Myer himself seemed a supporter of the former image. In his 1970 oral 
history interview, he recounted detailed facts of his long career, but provides little 
analysis of the reasoning behind or the consequences of his actions. For him, his 
work consisted of a series of problems that had arisen before his time in office, 
which he tackled in the most efficient way possible.65 
Myer offered only one additional personal reflection on Native Americans in 
the almost 400 pages of interview. In it, he concludes that he hopes that Native 
Americans “will be emerging as active people in politics, as lawyers and doctors 
and professional people of various types, because nowadays many of them are 
going to the same schools as white people are, and they are getting the opportunity 
to go to college.”66 This quotation yet again demonstrates Meyer’s belief in his own 
“benevolence” and that he was helping his clients integrate. 
In relation to Japanese American incarceration, Myer had little choice 
besides refusing outright his appointment as director of the WRA. Japanese 
Americans had been incarcerated by legislation, and his opportunities for 
changing the situation or conditions in the camps were limited. As Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs, he spent three years as part of the long history of solving the 
unavoidable “Native American problem.” At the BIA, too, he was constrained not 
only by the prevalent ideology, but also by history. Long before Myer’s time, it had 
become impossible to ignore Native Americans.  
Nothing indicates that Myer supported the segregation or different 
treatment of Native Americans or Japanese Americans from that of white 
Americans. Furthermore, he did not suggest that these minorities were inherently 
or racially inferior, contrary to many statements made in Congress at the time. 
Yet there is no doubt that Myer viewed white American culture as the most 
desirable form of culture, one to be attained by everyone. 
In the context of this study, it is useless to argue either for or against the 
general policy of assimilation. It had been the official, widely accepted, policy, 
especially with respect to Native Americans, already since the mid-nineteenth 
century, and it continued throughout the 1940s and 1950s.67 In other words, it was 
not extraordinary to desire the assimilation of either the Japanese Americans or 
the Native Americans. Had Myer been deeply racist, he probably would have been 
able to achieve a higher turnout for the voluntary expatriation of inmates.68 His 
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Native American policies, furthermore, seem to have been driven mostly by 
financial reasons. 
Rather than being racially motivated, Myer’s rhetoric was paternalistic: he 
believed that his agency and his fellow white Americans had an obligation to “help” 
his subjects to become “better” Americans.69 While a certain degree of racial 
superiority is obvious in such thinking, I would rather call it ignorance than 
racism. Most significantly, Myer’s public discourse was remarkably less racist 
than that of, for example, many Congressmen. In my interpretation, he was a 
product of his time rather than the main villain. He had an established notion of 
what it was to be an American, and he wanted to enable many people to become 
part of it: “I have some experience with the problems of minorities in our country 
and I know that their finest hopes and aspirations are as truly in the American 
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